Software Vault: The Diamond Collection/The Diamond Collection (Software Vault)(Digital Impact).ISO/cdr16/tc15_052.zip/TC15-052.TXT

Text File | 1995-01-22 | 25KB | 576 lines

TELECOM Digest     Sat, 21 Jan 95 05:34:00 CST    Volume 15 : Issue 52

Inside This Issue:                          Editor: Patrick A. Townson

    DOJ Computer Siezure Guide (Dave Banisar)
    T1 vs. T3: What's the Difference (Alan Jackson)
    In the Matter of Callback Services (Paul Robinson)
    Worldwide Area Code Listing Available via ftp (Paul Robinson)
    New York A-Carrier Roaming Ban Lifted (Greg Monti)
    Cellular Phone Information (Lokesh Kalpa)
    LD Termination Fees to RBOCs (Pete Norloff)
    Looking for SS7 / CCS7 Spec Information (George E. Cabanas)
    Looking for Autodialers For Callback (Hadi Fakhoury)
    Canadian Carrier TelRoute in Receivership (Dave Leibold)
    American Literature on Multimedia (Toyoaki Kondo)
    MCI Won't Bill For Calls Already Made to 1-800-CALL-INFO
(bkron.netcom.com)

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----------------------------------------------------------------------

Organization: Electronic Privacy Information Center
From: Dave Banisar <[e-mail]>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 1995 21:08:18 EST
Subject: DOJ Computer Siezure Guidel


EPIC Analysis of New Justice Department Draft Guidelines on Searching
and Seizing Computers

Dave Banisar
Electronic Privacy Information Center


The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) has obtained the
Department of Justice's recently issued draft "Federal Guidelines for
Searching and Seizing Computers."  EPIC obtained the document under
the Freedom of Information Act.  The guidelines provide an overview of
the law surrounding searches, seizures and uses of computer systems
and electronic information in criminal and civil cases.  They discuss
current law and suggest how it may apply to situations involving
computers.  The draft guidelines were developed by the Justice
Department's Computer Crime Division and an informal group of federal
agencies known as the Computer Search and Seizure Working Group.

Seizing Computers

A major portion of the document deals with the seizure of computers.
The draft recommends the use of the "independent component doctrine"
to determine if a reason can be articulated to seize each separate
piece of hardware.  Prosecutors are urged to "seize only those pieces
of equipment necessary for basic input/output so that the government
can successfully execute the warrant."  The guidelines reject the
theory that because a device is connected to a target computer, it
should be seized, stating that "[i]n an era of increased networking,
this kind of approach can lead to absurd results."

However, the guidelines also note that computers and accessories are
frequently incompatible or booby trapped, thus recommending that
equipment generally should be seized to ensure that it will work.
They recommend that irrelevant material should be returned quickly.
"[O]nce the analyst has examined the computer system and data and
decided that some items or information need not be kept, the
government should return this property as soon as possible."  The
guidelines suggest that it may be possible to make exact copies of the
information on the storage devices and return the computers and data
to the suspects if they sign waivers stating that the copy is an exact
replica of the original data.

On the issue of warrantless seizure and "no-knock warrants," the
guidelines note the ease of destroying data.  If a suspect is observed
destroying data, a warrantless seizure may occur, provided that a
warrant is obtained before an actual search can proceed.  For "no-
knock"
warrants, the guidelines caution that more than the mere fact that the
evidence can be easily destroyed is required before such a warrant can
be issued.  "These problems ... are not, standing alone, sufficient
to justify dispensing with the knock-and-announce rule."


Searching Computers:

Generally, warrants are required for searches of computers unless
there is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.  The
guidelines recommend that law enforcement agents use utility programs
to conduct limited searches for specific information, both because the
law prefers warrants that are narrowly tailored and for reasons of
economy.  "The power of the computer allows analysts to design a
limited search in other ways as well ... by specific name, words,
places ..."

For computer systems used by more than one person, the guidelines
state that the consent of one user is enough to authorize a search of
the entire system, even if each user has a different directory.
However, if users have taken "special steps" to protect their privacy,
such as using passwords or encryption, a search warrant is necessary.
The guidelines suggest that users do not have an expectation of
privacy on commercial services and large mainframe systems because
users should know that system operators have the technical ability to
read all files on such systems.  They recommend that the most prudent
course is to obtain a warrant, but suggest that in the absence of a
warrant prosecutors should argue that "reasonable users will also
expect system administrators to be able to access all data on the
system."  Employees may also have an expectation of privacy in their
computers that would prohibit employers from consenting to police
searches.  Public employees are protected by the Fourth Amendment and
searches of their computers are prohibited except for "non-
investigatory,
work related intrusions" and "investigatory searches for evidence of
suspected work-related employee misfeasance."

The guidelines discuss the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, which was
successfully used in the Steve Jackson Games case against federal
agents.  They recommend that "before searching any BBS, agents must
carefully consider the restrictions of the PPA."  Citing the Jackson
case, they leave open the question of whether BBS's by themselves are
subject to the PPA and state that "the scope of the PPA has been
greatly expanded as a practical consequence of the revolution in
information technology -- a result which was probably not envisioned
by the Act's drafters."  Under several DOJ memos issued in 1993, all
applications for warrants under the Privacy Protection Act must be
approved by a Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division or the supervising DOJ attorney.

For computers that contain private electronic mail protected by the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, prosecutors are advised
to inform the judge that private email may be present and avoid
reading communications not covered in the warrant.  Under the ECPA, a
warrant is required for email on a public system that is stored for
less than 180 days.  If the mail is stored for more than 180 days, law
enforcement agents can obtain it either by using a subpoena (if they
inform the target beforehand) or by using a warrant without notice.

For computers that contain confidential information, the guidelines
recommend that forensic experts minimize their examination of
irrelevant files.  It may also be possible to appoint a special master
to search systems containing privileged information.

One important section deals with issues relating to encryption and the
Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination.  The
guidelines
caution that a grant of limited immunity may be necessary before
investi-
gators can compel disclosure of an encryption key from a suspect. This
suggestion is significant given recent debates over the Clipper Chip
and the possibility of mandatory key escrow.


Computer Evidence:

The draft guidelines also address issues relating to the use of
computerized information as evidence.  The guidelines note that "this
area may become a new battleground for technical experts."  They
recognize the unique problems of electronic evidence: "it can be
created, altered, stored, copied, and moved with unprecedented ease,
which creates both problems and opportunities for advocates."  The
guidelines discuss scenarios where digital photographs can be easily
altered without a trace and the potential use of digital signatures to
create electronic seals.  They also raise questions about the use of
computer generated evidence, such as the results of a search failing
to locate an electronic tax return in a computer system.  An
evaluation
of the technical processes used will be necessary: "proponents must be
prepared to show that the process is reliable."


Experts:

The DOJ guidelines recommend that experts be used in all computer
seizures and searches -- "when in doubt, rely on experts."  They
provide a list of experts from within government agencies, such as the
Electronic Crimes Special Agent program in the Secret Service (with 12
agents at the time of the writing of the guidelines), the Computer
Analysis and Response Team of the FBI, and the seized recovery
specialists (SERC) in the IRS.  The guidelines reveal that "[m]any
companies such as IBM and Data General employ some experts solely to
assist various law enforcement agencies on search warrants."  Other
potential experts include local universities and the victims of crimes
themselves, although the guidelines caution that there may be
potential
problems of bias when victims act as experts.


Obtaining a Copy of the Guidelines:

EPIC, with the cooperation of the Bureau of National Affairs, is
making the guidelines available electronically.  The document is
available via FTP/Gopher/WAIS/listserv from the EPIC online archive at
cpsr.org /cpsr/privacy/epic/fed_computer_siezure_guidelines.txt. A
printed version appears in the Bureau of National Affairs publication,
Criminal Law Reporter, Vol. 56, No. 12 (December 21 1994).

About EPIC:

The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a public interest
research center in Washington, DC.  It was established in 1994 to
focus public attention on emerging privacy issues relating to the
National Information Infrastructure, such as the Clipper Chip, the
Digital Telephony proposal, medical record privacy, and the sale of
consumer data.  EPIC is sponsored by the Fund for Constitutional
Government and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility.  EPIC
publishes the EPIC Alert and EPIC Reports, pursues Freedom of
Information Act litigation, and conducts policy research on emerging
privacy issues.  For more information email [e-mail], or write
EPIC, 666 Pennsylvania Ave., S.E., Suite 301, Washington, DC 20003. +1
202 544 9240 (tel), [phone] (fax).

The Fund for Constitutional Government is a non-profit organization
established in 1974 to protect civil liberties and constitutional
rights.  Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility is a
national membership organization of people concerned about the impact
of technology on society. For information contact: [e-mail].

Tax-deductible contributions to support the work of EPIC should be
made payable to the Fund for Constitutional Government.


David Banisar ([e-mail])       * 202-544-9240 (tel)
Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax)
666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301  * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org
Washington, DC 20003                * HTTP://epic.digicash.com/epic

------------------------------

From: Alan Jackson <[e-mail]>
Subject: T1 vs. T3: What's the Difference?
Date: 20 Jan 1995 18:42:47 GMT
Organization: South Coast Computer Services (sccsi.com)


What's the difference between the two as far as the user is concerned?

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 20 Jan 1995 13:42:18 EST
From: Paul Robinson <[e-mail]>
Organization: Tansin A. Darcos & Company, Silver Spring, MD USA
Subject: In the Matter of Callback Services


> There ought to be a flag which tells the CO receiving a call if the
> call is from within or without the USA, and to reject those calls
> which originate in the USA. ("I'm sorry, the number you dialed
cannot
> be reached from within the USA").

The simplest way would be if the service provider knew what carrier
was delivering the call, then they could make arrangements with these
carriers to both save them some money and perhaps make some
arrangement
with them to share the calls coming back.

You set up the system so that the carrier sends only a single line
from their switch for international calls, and all it has to do is
pass down the destination number; they don't even need to supply a
voice channel.  Calls that come from U.S. Destinations through the
carrier are given answer supervision and a message either that the
customer is refusing calls from US numbers or that they called an
outgoing trunk like.  This would then charge the caller the minimum
10c for connecting to the number.  Caller ID could be put on the trunk
lines; callers that are marked as blocked or local either get a busy
signal, an announcement that it's an outgoing only trunk, or just get
spiked with an immediate answer and disconnect, causing them to pay
for a message unit.

If you know which carriers provide overseas service from the countries
in question, you can get the major carriers to go along with it in
exchange for saving them money since they now no longer pay the 2c
termination charge to the local telephone company, and would get
outgoing business from the service being generated.

But, the point being except where phone rates are still very high,
these services aren't of much use because the phone rates for most
direct-dial calls have been reduced as a result of the mere existence
of arbitrage service resellers.  What they would still be good for is
bypassing dial restrictions, e.g. from an Arab country to Israel, or
other places where direct dial calls are not permitted due to local
regulations.  And also for making long distance calls that the local
authorities have no means to discover the termination number, e.g. a
U.S. company without local presence there can tell a southeast asian
government to get lost when it demands toll records of someone over
there since that government's orders have no validity here, as has
been the practice where local banks were typically ordered to provide
all credit card transactions of locals.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 20 Jan 1995 14:00:13 EST
From: Paul Robinson <[e-mail]>
Organization: Tansin A. Darcos & Company, Silver Spring, MD USA
Subject: Worldwide Area Code Listing Available via FTP


I am in the final stages of updating my list of US and international
area code, telex code, datagram numbers and country codes.  I would
like comments from anyone who is interested in the information in the
document to take a look and check for any errors or additional related
information I could squeeze into this before it is submitted for
publication as an Internet RFC to replace my current RFC 1394.

I am interested in making sure I have all of the currently proposed
new format US area codes as well as any city or province codes of
major large international cities.  Also of any related information I
could have included which is not part of this document.

The document's name is:

/internet-draft/draft-robinson-newtelex-01.txt

It is 154,911 bytes in size.  I would like to receive any final
comments by February 1.  If you cannot FTP you can obtain the document
by E-Mail.

The FTP sites having the document are:

Africa:        ftp.is.co.za    (196.4.160.2)
Europe:        nic.nordu.net   (192.36.148.17)
Pacific Rim:   munnari.oz.au   (128.250.1.21)
US East Coast: ds.internic.net (198.49.45.10)
US West Coast: ftp.isi.edu     (128.9.0.32)

To obtain the document by E-mail, send a message to:
<[e-mail]> In the body (the subject is ignored) type:

FILE /internet-drafts/draft-robinson-newtelex-01.txt

Thank you for any assistance, and I hope this document will be of use
to some people.


[TELECOM Digest Editor's Note: International country codes and related
files are also available in the Telecom Archives at lcs.mit.edu.
PAT]

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 20 Jan 1995 11:56:59 EST
From: Greg Monti <[e-mail]>
Subject: New York A-Carrier Roaming Ban Lifted


According to a story in the January 20, 1995, issue of {Communications
Daily}, Cellular One Baltimore/Washington's ban on automatic roaming
(and on billed-to-your-cell-phone roaming) in the New York City area
"A" system existed only from November 30 to January 9.  This is the
first word I have heard that the service is back.

The story says that C1-Wash-Balt blocked customer calls from New York
"while installing antipiracy equipment."

This was mentioned at the bottom of a story noting that New York City
police have accused a 28-year-old Uruguayan native of forgery,
computer tampering and other charges in cloning of several hundred

·
cellular numbers.


Greg Monti, Tech Mgr, FISPO, Distribution Division
National Public Radio          Phone:    [phone]
635 Massachusetts Av NW        Fax:      [phone]
Washington, DC  20001-3753     Internet: [e-mail]

------------------------------

From: LOKESH KALRA <[e-mail]>
Subject: Cellular Phone Information Wanted
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 1995 12:16:22 EST


Hello,

Is there a place other than the January 93 issue of {Consumer Reports}
(probably quite out of date now) that discusses the Cellular/Mobile
phone technology, kinds of plans offered, and the various models and
how they are rated?

Would appreaciate any info at [e-mail]


Regards,

Lokesh

------------------------------

From: [e-mail] (Pete Norloff)
Subject: LD Termination Fees to RBOCs
Date: 20 Jan 1995 17:29:51 GMT
Organization: LC Technologies, Inc.
Reply-To: [e-mail]


I'm looking for some information on the sharing of long distance fees
between long distance carriers and the RBOCs.  I've found casual
references which indicate that the long distance carriers pay the
RBOCs approximately 25% each of the fees collected for long distance
calls and keep 50% for themselves.  This 25% was referred to as
something like "line termination charges".  It's the payment to the
local carrier for connecting one end of the call.

I'm hoping to find an authoritative reference to help me in an
argument with a Bell Atlantic engineer.  This engineer believes that
Bell Atlantic is providing the terminating end of long distance calls
to the long distance carriers for free.

Anyone have any information on this topic?


Thanks.

------------------------------

From: [e-mail] (George E. Cabanas)
Subject: Looking For SS7 / CCS7 Spec Information
Date: 20 Jan 1995 12:58:36 -0500
Organization: PANIX Public Access Internet and Unix, NYC


Hello all,

I'm looking for an archive site that has documents detailing the SS7 /
CCS7 specs.  I'm interested in the control and alarm messages
produced.  Any information would be greatly appreciated.


Thanks,

George E. Cabanas    [e-mail]

------------------------------

From: [e-mail] (Hadi Fakhoury)
Subject: Looking For Autodialers For Callback
Date: 20 Jan 1995 18:20:03 GMT
Organization: Project GLUE, University of Maryland, College Park


I am looking for autodialers to be used in conjunction with a callback
service, for both single line and PBX usage. The dialer in effect
renders the service transparent to me.

Any information would be appreciated. Please post response or email to
[e-mail].


Thanks,

Hadi

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 20 Jan 1995 00:24:00 -0500
From: [e-mail] (Dave Leibold)
Subject: Canadian Carrier TelRoute in Receivership


{The Toronto Star}, among other Canadian media outlets, reports that
TelRoute Communications, one of the major new competitive Canadian
long distance carriers, is in receivership. TelRoute owed $15-16
million to various companies, including Teleglobe, Fonorola, and Bell
Canada to which $3.5 million is owed. TelRoute's specialty was to be
its microwave network, and there are reported debts with their
Toronto-Buffalo link.

Last weekend, Bell Canada switched many of TelRoute's 40 000 customers
off equal access, mostly to default to Bell (or in one case I'm
familiar with, the line was defaulted to Unitel). After some legal
wrangling, Bell is to return TelRoute customers default status back to
its customers for now.  TelRoute will operate for another three weeks
while receiver Peat Marwick Thorne attempts to sell the assets,
according to reported terms of agreement between Bell and TelRoute.

The TelRoute failure, along with the recent bankruptcy of smaller
carrier Northquest Ventures (whose assets were sold to Fonorola),
marks a definitive beginning of a shake-out in the Canadian long
distance industry, where a surprisingly large number of companies took
advantage of the 1992 CRTC decision to open long distance competition.

------------------------------

From: [e-mail] (Toyoaki Kondo)
Subject: American Literature on Multimedia
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 1995 00:30:17 -0600
Organization: Northwestern University


Does anyone know of any good books or information on how technologies,
especially multimedia, will change economic activities of consumers
and producers, life styles, political participations, culture,
perceptions, and international economic relations.

   I'm doing a comperative study of Japanese literature and American
literature on multimedia. I am having a hard time finding American
literature. If somebody knows any relevant resource, I would
appreciate
your help.


Thank you,

Toyo

------------------------------

From: [e-mail] (BUBEYE!)
Subject: MCI Won't Bill For Calls Already Made to 1-800-CALL-INFO
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 261-4700
guest)
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 1995 06:57:59 GMT


I saw a wire story which said that MCI reached an agreement with 17
states
whereby they will not bill customers for calls they have already made
to their 1-800-CALL-INFO service.

------------------------------

End of TELECOM Digest V15 #52
*****************************